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Abstract: his article assesses the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the 
Western Balkans, with a focus on EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Althea is 
a military operation that conducts mainly civilian functions as well as the training of the Bah 
Armed Forces; its ‘civilianisation’ is symptomatic of CSDP’s orientation as a mainly civilian cri-
sis management instrument. Althea works within the framework of the Union’s ‘comprehensive 
approach’ to regional development and the accession process of the Western Balkans to the EU. 
I argue that the mission displays the bureaucratic modus operandi of CSDP and not a Grand 
Strategy approach. Nevertheless, CSDP’s incremental, lowest-common-denominator, low cost, 
low risk bureaucratic politics have enabled a form of emergent strategy that complements the 
Union’s multi-instrument and comprehensive approach to development throughout the West-
ern Balkans. I further suggest that the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and the newly activated 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) provides opportunities for EU member states to 
build on low key emergent strategy to ensure that CSDP develops the substance and actorness 
needed to address current threats. 
Keywords: Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), EUFOR Althea, bureaucratic poli-
tics, Grand Strategy, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), civilianisation, comprehensive approach.
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Introduction
he EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has often been judged positively in 
respect of its 35 missions to date, especially in the Balkans where the Union is generally 
perceived to have made a useful security contribution. CSDP missions are mostly suc-
cessful within limited remits1, especially considering the modest costs involved – €2.3bn 
in the multiannual inancial framework 2014–2020, or 0.22 per cent of total EU expen-
diture.2 But critical assessments report variable achievement and shortcomings in speed 
of deployment, strategic coherence and personnel provision.3 Limited success is more 
achievable where ambition is low and missions are relatively small and straightforward. A 
review of twelve missions concluded that the Union had some way to go before it could 
be described as a strategic actor.4 But in the cases reviewed, missions did meet a key aim 
of the European Security Strategy:5 ‘(to) avert security threats, stabilise the immediate 
neighbourhood (and) strengthen efective multilateralism’.6
Successful contribution within a multi-agency approach to post-conlict stabilisation 
should not hide other weaknesses. his article looks at CSDP impact in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina (BiH), a post-conlict theatre where the Union has been heavily engaged, and 
where its lagship mission, EUFOR Althea, has been relatively expensive within the total-
ity of CSDP. he scale of EU engagement suggests that BiH has always been a strategic 
priority for the Union, but Althea has been scaled down from its initial 7,000 troops to 
just 600 personnel now.
CSDP evolved as a primarily civilian-oriented conlict prevention instrument, but it is 
doubtful that this remains adequate given the new challenges on Europe’s borders. Mi-
gration lows from the Western Balkans, including from BiH and Kosovo in 2016, were 
considerable as economic growth remained stalled across the region due to political stale-
mate and limited inward investment.7
his paper addresses three propositions: Grand Strategy (GS) failed to materialise and 
instead CSDP has evolved through bureaucratic processes; EUFOR Althea lacks a proper 
strategic focus consistent with the idea of GS; the mission encapsulates bureaucratic poli-
tics and despite limitations, it has contributed to an emergent EU regional strategy. he 
paper also traces CSDP development through a bureaucratic functionality towards, post-
EU Global Strategy (EUGS), a potentially more substantial presence in security afairs. I 
1 Solana 2007a; Emerson and Gross 2007; Witney 2008; Menon 2009; Grevi et al. 2009; Kirchner 
2013.
2 European Parliament 2016a, 1.
3 Witney 2008; Asseburg and Kempin 2009, 5–7; Berg, 2009; Mattelaer 2013.
4 Asseburg and Kempin 2009.
5 Solana 2003.
6 Asseburg and Kempin 2009, 259.
7 Euractiv 2015.
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argue that a new momentum exists through the EUGS with leadership from HRVP Mogh-
erini and especially since a decade after its introduction in Treaty of Lisbon, the European 
Council sanctioned the implementation Permanent Structured Cooperation.8
he post-Lisbon CSDP consists of civilian and security-based instruments underpinned 
by the comprehensive approach (CA), understood as ‘a stress on preventive action using 
a full range of EU policy tools directed towards a single target/problem (with a spectrum 
of tools including) military, policing, law, human rights, and economic development re-
sources’.9 he CA involves a combination of political, economic and security initiatives. 
he CSDP is an intrinsic component of the CA, even more so post-Lisbon given the 
greater proximity between Council foreign afairs interests and the Commission’s role in 
development. 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)was meant to engage groups of willing and 
able member states in combined CSDP initiatives, but results proved disappointing. Lis-
bon reinforced state primacy in foreign and security policy, emphasising the need for 
unanimity, and underlining the importance of sovereign traditions and preferences, espe-
cially in respect of NATO. he Union sufered a collective loss of conidence following the 
Euro crisis, approximately coinciding with the launch in 2010 of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), CSDP’s institutional enabler. Budgetary austerity therefore meant 
a further squeeze on CSDP resourcing.
his article argues that EU engagement in Bosnia has relected bureaucratic politics rather 
than any Grand Strategy. Nevertheless, an emergent strategy can be discerned, evidenced 
throughout the CSDP process, reminiscent of ‘Europe as a small power’.10 he paper uses sub-
stantial historical literature, including evidence from EU institutions, media commentaries, 
and supported by opinion from 28 semi-structured interviews conducted between 2010 and 
2013 with experts involved with or close to CSDP policy making and EUFOR Althea.
We begin with commentary on Grand Strategy aspirations, followed by an explanation of 
bureaucratic politics applied to CSDP. he next section examines EUFOR Althea in rela-
tion to bureaucratic politics. hen the paper claims that from a bureaucratic seedbed, an 
emergent strategy is discernible. he conclusion asserts that EUGS and PESCO provide 
fresh opportunities for CSDP to achieve substance.
8 Biscop 2017.
9 Smith 2012, 265–6.
10 Toje 2008, 2011.
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CSDP: Grand Strategy, or bureaucratic politics?
Critical literature holds that CSDP requires a Grand Strategy to achieve substance.11 
Substance means adequate military capability, coherence and actorness to address per-
ceived threats.12 he ESS identiied terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMDs), regional conlicts, state failure and organised crime as key threats.13 his 
was up-dated to include cyber security and energy security14 and an emphasis on human 
security.15 Now new threats abound including renewed Russian militarism, the wars in 
Ukraine and Syria, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) instability after the 2011 
Arab Uprising, and migratory lows towards Europe.
Grand Strategy, ‘the calculated relationship between means and large ends’16 requires 
member states to deine common interests, and to engage in state-level adaptation and 
therefore Europeanisation.17 It also requires institutions at the European level that are 
competent to deliver defence and security integration. here is therefore an association 
between Grand Strategy and Europeanisation, as both imply integration. GS demands 
intergovernmental consensus that may lead to a more federal, state-like EU. But Lisbon 
emphasises intergovernmentalism, and member states consistently demonstrate a lack of 
consensus on common interests and even on common threats, let alone on how to address 
these. his undermines Grand Strategy. he impact of the UK’s presumed departure from 
the EU (‘Brexit’) further undermines GS since the UK and France are the only member 
states capable of power projection. Grand Strategy supports a comprehensive approach:
(It) refers to the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s 
deliberate efort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic 
tools together to advance that state’s national interest. Grand strategy is 
the art of reconciling ends and means.18
GS proponents have long complained that the Union has not developed an adequate stra-
tegic culture underpinned by military and civilian capability, and served by political will,19 
so the EU lacks ‘actorness’ in this area, understood as ‘(the) capacity to behave actively 
and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’.20
11 Biscop 2009, 2013a; Howorth 2010; Simòn 2011; Biscop and Coelmont 2010a, 2012.
12 Shepherd 2003.
13 Solana 2003.
14 European Council 2008
15 Kaldor 2007, 2012; Whitman 2013, 193.
16 Gaddis 2009.
17 Radaelli 2003.
18 Feaver 2009, 1.
19 Biscop 2009, 2010; Howorth 2010; Biscop and Coelmont 2012.
20 Sjöstedt 1977, 16.
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GS demands either top-down strategic drivers, or consensus and commitment from a 
signiicant majority of member states. Neither condition was forthcoming, but in June 
2015 the Council provided fresh impetus.21 It tasked High Representative-Vice President 
(HRVP) Federica Mogherini with creating a ‘common, comprehensive and consistent EU 
global strategy’.22 his ended ten years of slow progress since the 1999 Cologne Council.23 
he EU Global Strategy (EUGS) arrived in June 2016 at an inauspicious moment, just days 
after the UK’s ‘Brexit’ referendum. Perhaps the EUGS launch was meant as a show of unity 
against possible claims that the Union faced disintegration.24 he EUGS was well received 
by GS proponents, since it potentially ofers new momentum towards common security 
and defence.25 But to be efective, it requires commitment, resourcing and implementa-
tion, otherwise it merely adds to the recurrent rhetoric about CFSP/CSDP. 
HRVP Mogherini has efectively martialled Council, member states and Commission sup-
port for this new impetus.26 he Brexit referendum appeared to damage CSDP, the UK gov-
ernment has consistently underlined its commitment to European defence and security.27
A historical problem for CSDP and one that consistently undermined GS has been the 
veto, the ‘security exemption’28 and the unanimity requirement. hese ensure a prevailing 
minimalism, hampering any strategic shift towards CSDP achieving substance. Former HR 
Ashton recognised this: ‘We should not delude ourselves. Lisbon left (the) CFSP as inter-
governmental and subject to unanimity decision-making: (in the) absence of political will or 
an agreement amongst the member states there are limits to what the (EEAS) can deliver’.29
he European Defence Agency (EDA)tries to enhance CSDP efectiveness by identifying 
pathways towards better capability and eiciency savings.30 Likewise, the EEAS provides 
opportunities for policy entrepreneurship.31A third enabler is the HRVP, on which the 
Lisbon Treaty makes arguably excessive demands. Several observers criticised the ‘multi-
ple hats’ involved, arguing that this compromised efectiveness,32 but Mogherini has won 
21 European Council 2015.
22 Mogherini 2015a, 3.
23 European Council 1999a.
24 Mälksoo 2016.
25 Biscop 2016; Helly 2016; Dijkstra 2016.
26 Novotnà 2017.
27 HM Government 2017a, 2017b.
28 Treaty of Lisbon 2007, Art. 346.
29 Ashton 2013, 3 cited in Hadield and Fiott 2014, 172.
30 Blockmans and Wessel 2009; Zwolski 2012a, 2012b.
31 Crowe 2008; Mauri and Gya 2009; Grässle 2011; Biscop 2011a; Kaunert and Léonard 2012; 
Dijkstra 2012b; Martin 2013; Sus 2014.
32 Grässle 2011; Dinan 2011; Hadield and Fiott 2013; Helwig 2013; Howorth 2013.
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praise for her energetic and proactive leadership.33 Her major achievement to date, the 
EUGS, potentially provides for a more strategic approach.34
Bureaucratic politics is characterised by ‘bargaining along regularized channels among 
players positioned hierarchically within the government’.35 Freedman identiies an asso-
ciation between bureaucracy and strategy, arguing that the rise to prominence of strategy 
as a conceptual instrument in problem-solving is a recent phenomenon that coincides 
with ‘the bureaucratisation of organisations, professionalisation of functions, and growth 
of the social sciences’.36
his complements the Weberian claim that bureaucracy is a characteristic of contempo-
rary capitalism. Much scholarly work addresses bureaucracy and bureaucratic politics.37 
Lindblom referred to the ‘science of muddling through’ as representative of modern po-
litical process,38 echoed in later studies.39 Bickerton applies the notion of bureaucratic 
politics to foreign policy40 while others have speciically addressed the bureaucratic fea-
tures of CDSP.41
As early as 2004, Michael Smith referred to the developing EU institutional inluence 
in common foreign and security policy, suggesting that the traditional view of intergov-
ernmentalism and state control over these policy ields was becoming subject to other 
Brussels-based pressures, including bureaucratization.42Consolidated institutions ofer 
potential policy entrepreneurship and may enable greater efectiveness through bureau-
cratic practice. 
Wilson refers to bureaucracies consisting of multiple channels, complex power relation-
ships, and ill-deined roles.43 he bureaucratic politics of CSDP operates through a hier-
archy of actors and multiple components in a complex and highly networked institutional 
arena. According to Giddens, bureaucracy, using the Weberian conception, is a funda-
33 von Ondarza and Scheler 2017.
34 Biscop 2015.
35 Allison 1969, 970.
36 Freedman 2013, xiii.
37 Weber 1964, 1971; Giddens 1971; Mintzberg 1978, 1979; Wilson 1991; Allison 1969; Allison 
and Zelikow 1999; Barnett and Finnemore 1999; du Gay 2000; Kanninen and Piiparinen 2014; 
Urry 2008; Hartlapp et al. 2013.
38 Lindblom 1959.
39 Beetham 1987; Bossong and Benner 2010, 1079.
40 Bickerton 2011, 2013.
41 Dijkstra, 2009, 2011, 2012a; Vanhoonacker et al. 2010; Bossong and Benner 2010; Chappell and 
Petrov 2014.
42 Smith 2004.
43 Wilson 1991.
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mental feature of advanced societies: ‘he modern capitalist state is completely depen-
dent upon bureaucratic organisation for its existence’.44
Giddens summarises the Weberian bureaucratic organisation as comprised of specialist 
oicials appointed on the basis of technical competence evidenced by diplomas, qualii-
cations, and experience; they perform deined functions within authoritarian and clearly 
demarcated hierarchies. Weber considers bureaucratic organisation as ‘the most rational 
known means of carrying out imperative control (and) superior to any other form in pre-
cision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline and in its reliability’.45
Weber’s positive perspective contrasts with contemporary criticism of bureaucracy as 
complex, restrictive, unresponsive, and frequently dismissed as ‘red tape’.46 Moreover, ‘ac-
cording to conventional wisdom, bureaucracy stands for unnecessary and burdensome 
regulation’.47
Weber48 suggests that specialist technical expertise and rationality explains the superior-
ity of bureaucratic organisations over alternative forms of societal organisation, but while 
his formulation was based on hierarchical structures, twenty-irst century post-Weberian 
bureaucracies are founded on the ‘network logic of globalisation’.49 Bureaucracy also im-
plies an absence of charismatic leadership or indeed any leadership, as policies emerge 
from decision making processes involving networks of oicials and technocrats. In this 
way ‘the power of international organisations and bureaucracies generally is that they 
present themselves as impersonal, technocratic, and neutral – as not exercising power but 
instead as serving others’.50
Urry alludes to post-Weberian bureaucracies’ powers, beneitting from transnational net-
works involving interactions between multiple actors that enable lexible and more ei-
cient responses to emerging conlicts.51 Such processes are relected in a seminal descrip-
tion of how government bureaucracies operate:
(Government organisations) are called into being by political processes; 
their goals, like their masters, are often difuse; (they) are especially bur-
dened by unique constraints; they cannot keep their proits; they have 
limited control over organisation of production; they have limited con-
44 Giddens 1971, 159.
45 Weber 1970, 267.
46 du Gay 2000, 1.
47 Kanninen and Piiparinen 2014, 48.
48 Weber 1964.
49 Kanninen and Piiparinen 2014, 49.
50 Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, 708.
51 Urry 2008.
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trol over their goals; they have external (as well as internal) goals gov-
erning their administrative procedures; and their outputs take a form 
that often defy easy evaluation of success or failure.52
Limited resources constrain organisations’ ability to fulil goals set by their masters and 
inertia sets in as the transaction costs of change increase. An inevitable characteristic of 
complex bureaucracies, of which armed forces are an example, is the obligation to com-
promise on what principals deine as organisational goals. his its with CSDP and may 
explain sub-optimal outcomes and even strategic incoherence. Organisations do not lack 
central purpose or goals, but they become prey to ‘bureaucratic drift’.53 hey adopt norms 
and routines ‘where satisicing is the rule stopping with the irst alternative that is good 
enough (…) the menu of choice is severely limited and success is more likely to be deined 
simply as compliance with relevant rules’.54
his matches the observation that CSDP relects lowest-common-denominator agree-
ment.55 It is characteristic of bureaucracies that executives wish to obtain allies at a rea-
sonable price while operators – those implementing policy – seek to cope with a situation 
by getting adequate commitment, guidance and resources from above.56 his is a good 
summation of the lowest-common-denominator impediment to strategic coherence or 
Grand Strategy. Allison refers to chiefs oriented around power and Indians around feasi-
bility.57 Furthermore, bureaucrats are constrained by their political masters.58 hey may at 
best ‘muddle through’ towards limited objectives.59 he political masters of CSDP are the 
PSC and member states, but bureaucratic politics does not suppose that decision making 
and implementation is limited to a single power node in a bureaucratic structure. Instead, 
policy making and implementation is highly difuse. Various other structures, many with-
in the EEAS, are important players in EU foreign and security policy. 
Lisbon also brought the Commission into focus, especially as EU Delegations are under 
Commission funding and control and the Commission supports Stabilisation and As-
sociation Agreements intended as steps towards EU accession. he European Defence 
Agency meanwhile, vital in capability enhancement and eicient resource allocation and 
procurement, sits outside the EEAS.
52 Allison and Zelikow 1999, 149.
53 Ibid., 152.
54 Ibid.
55 Smith 2008, 10; Rynning 2011, 30.
56 Wilson 1991, 205.
57 Allison 1971, 176−8.
58 Wilson, 1991:13.
59 Lindblom, 1959.
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he developing expertise of the EEAS has led to the emergence of epistemic communities 
at the heart of European security policy.60 hese communities of oicials and techno-
crats contribute to the bureaucratisation of the ield. A still unused CSDP instrument, the 
Battlegroups (BGs), also exhibit a bureaucratic process plagued by roster complexities, 
membership, and funding issues.61 But while they are bureaucratic and evidently have not 
contributed strategic actorness, BGs have brought beneits, speciically capability devel-
opment, interoperability, technical cooperation and force transformation.62
A further important association with bureaucratic politics is the open method of coor-
dination (OMC), an intergovernmental cooperative approach increasingly used to create 
framework directives and soft law, not the binding hard law adjudicated by the Court of 
Justice of the EU.63 OMC carries many of the characteristics of bureaucratic politics, in-
cluding reliance on technocratic assessments and lowest common denominator consen-
sus. Together with the activation of PESCO, this ofers an important way forward for the 
development of common security and defence policy.64
he argument so far presented can be summarised as follows. Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy was instituted at Maastricht in the TEU as intergovernmental, ensuring state 
primacy in policy making. While member state authority was consolidated by the Lisbon 
Treaty, EU security policy and CSDP remained handicapped by a lack of strategic clarity, 
undermining capability development. hus, Grand Strategy failed to emerge from any 
part of the CFSP. However, the ield is no longer straightforwardly intergovernmental 
as emergent institutionalism with policy entrepreneurship especially around the EEAS 
has enabled evolution towards an efective if limited CSDP. It is further argued that a 
bureaucratic way of working involving multiple channels, similar in kind to the practice 
of open method of coordination in other policy ields and involving multiple actors and 
agencies, undermines the pure logic of intergovernmentalism. Networks and epistemic 
communities play an increasing role in the development of CSDP. he development and 
implementation of CSDP relects processes of bureaucratic politics. he next section 
brings evidence from primary research to analyse EUFOR Althea, the EU’s longest lasting 
military operation.
60 Adler and Haas 1992; Cross 2011; Bossong 2013; Pannier 2013.
61 Haine 2008.
62 Lindstrom 2007, 2011; Dickow et al. 2011; Chappell 2012; Biscop and Coelmont 2013.
63 Heidenreich and Zeitlin 2009.
64 Sweeney and Winn 2017.
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EUFOR Althea and Bureaucratic Politics
he above discussion sets the context within which EUFOR Althea operates. Interviews 
conducted for this research conirm the key characteristics of CSDP. A feature of CS-
DP’s intergovernmental governance has been inertia, as initiatives are subject to member 
states’ calculations regarding sovereignty and self-interest. States control resources and 
are the power brokers in mission deployment (Interviews 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 21). 
Reluctance to move beyond cooperation towards integration stems from atavistic con-
cerns over sovereignty and local protectionism, particularly regarding jobs (Interviews 2, 
3, 7, 9, 25). his prevents capability improvements on the scale sought by the European 
Defence Agency (EDA) and which Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was sup-
posed to deliver, but did not.65 Where no actual veto is applied, the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC), the highest level of CSDP decision-making, may reach a consensus 
based on some lowest common denominator position. In this environment, GS cannot 
prevail even if enhanced cooperation results. An example of the latter is the Battlegroup 
concept. A Berlin-based think-tank expert cites capability development, interoperability, 
technical cooperation and force transformation as stemming from Battlegroup develop-
ment (Interview 22).
Having dispensed with the notion of Grand Strategy as a viable way to progress CSDP, 
the ield appears to depend on an alternative approach to its evolution that has charac-
terised the process from the beginning, namely CSDP’s gradualist, incremental and low 
risk development through bureaucratic politics. his epitomises how CSDP works (Inter-
views 5, 7, 26, 27), especially since the EEAS was set up. From within the EEAS, Civilian 
Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and Secretariat oicials comment on the 
increasing expertise of the service and its role in developing epistemic communities (In-
terviews 13, 9). he EEAS has proved an embryonic institutional enabler, with increasing 
inluence over common foreign and security policy (Interviews 4, 5, 8, 9, 12). But ultimate-
ly CSDP depends on state-level decision-making through state-appointed ambassadors 
in the PSC. Once they authorise a mission, efectiveness depends on adequate and timely 
resourcing by member states, ever the central arbiters. After 2010, limited resources have 
been further squeezed by the imposition of austerity (Interviews 10, 11, 24, 26). 
EUFOR Althea has been the largest and longest running CSDP military operation, now 
in its fourteenth year. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) presents a challenging post-conlict 
environment with a high level of political and economic dysfunction. Althea accounts for 
only a tiny proportion of the total CFSP annual spend of €327m in 2016. Military opera-
tions are paid for by the participating states on a ‘costs lie where they fall’ basis, except 
that common costs are met through the Athena mechanism whereby member states pay 
in proportion to their gross domestic income. Althea’s common costs drawn from the 
65 Biscop and Coelmont 2010b, 2011; EDA 2014a.
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CFSP/CSDP budget amount to a modest €10m annually.66 Oicial estimates are that the 
EU meets around 10-15 per cent of the total costs of a CSDP military operation.67
Bosnia signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in June 
2015.68 his is signiicant because SAAs apply a comprehensive approach using multiple 
instruments within a strategic, long term framework.69A major political challenge in BiH 
is to prevent state institutions falling prey to corrupt politicians and oicials. CSDP im-
plementation has not protected Bosnia from the malign inluence of nationalists and for-
mer combatants who have assumed prominent positions in state institutions. A Balkans 
expert expressed the Weberian view that bureaucracy and the emergence of bureaucratic 
institutions would be a better state-building outcome than the capture of the state, or any 
constituent parts, by nationalists with blood on their hands (Interview 27). However, the 
Bosnian situation remains precarious given the lack of progress in both socio-economic 
development and in establishing a political environment free from atavistic and sectar-
ian nationalism. Indeed, EUFOR Althea recognises the acute challenges, noting the lack 
of commitment to federal institutions among political leaderships and the tendency for 
elections to be conducted along ethno-nationalist lines.70
EU post-conlict stabilisation and development eforts have brought clear beneits across 
the Balkans.71 On the other hand, others suggest a varied assessment with Bosnia and 
Kosovo still presenting major challenges,72 whereas other ex-Yugoslav territories have 
made more progress, most obviously Slovenia and Croatia which joined the EU in 2004 
and 2013 respectively. However, the implementation of an SAA for BiH is consistent with 
the ambitions of the comprehensive approach and with CSDP objectives.
he EU strategic aim is to stabilise the Western Balkans and to progress all constituent 
states towards candidacy and eventual Union accession. But Bosnia and Kosovo remain a 
long way from this goal. It is di cult to describe EU engagement in either as strategically 
successful while state dysfunction in both remains entrenched.73Recent reports of arms 
shipments to the Republika Srpska police and Russian-trained mercenaries working with 
paramilitary groups have brought new fears of a return to violence.74 he EU High Rep-
resentative for BiH, Valentin Inzko, expressed alarm at the purchase of 2,500 automatic 
riles, saying the entire police weapons count in his native Austria did not exceed 400. 
66 Boštjančič Pulko et al. 2016.
67 Di Mauro et al. 2017, 8; European Parliament 2016b.
68 European Commission 2015a.
69 Watanabe 2010.
70 EUFOR Althea 2017.
71 BBC News 2013; EEAS 2013b; Radio Free Europe 2013; Peen Rodt and Wolf 2012; Kirchner 
2013.
72 Gross and Rotta 2011; Biermann 2014; European Commission 2015b, 2015c.
73 Boštjančič Pulko et al. 2016; Capussela 2015a, 2015b; Jaqué 2015; European Commission 2015b.
74 Guardian, 2018a, 2018b.
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here are also reports of paramilitary activity among Islamist factions within the Bosnian-
Croat Federation.75 Perhaps the diminished scale of EUFOR Althea makes a new belliger-
ence more likely among nationalist factions, bringing inherent risks. Activity such as that 
reported makes the task of a reduced EUFOR Althea more di cult, but also more vital, 
as the operation plays an ‘eyes and ears’ role, monitoring risk. here is concern among the 
international community that Russian interests may destabilise BiH and the region, espe-
cially as Serbia appears to be developing trade, energy and weapons deals with Moscow, 
anathema to the EU, other Balkan states, and the USA.76
EUFOR Althea was launched in 2004 under a UN mandate, an EU operation on behalf of 
and relecting the will of the international community. here have been no deaths from 
armed violence since EUFOR replaced SFOR in December 2004. It successfully fulils its 
original mandate to uphold the Dayton Peace Agreement77 drawn up to end the war, and 
it has continued to contribute to a safe and secure environment (Interviews 15–21). he 
mission has garnered a generally positive assessment from the academic community78 and 
from governmental and EU sources.79 But caution should be exercised in declaring the EU 
presence in BiH comprehensively successful. Overhaus refers to a ‘frozen conlict’80 that 
requires strategic efort from the EU and member states and the ability to intervene mili-
tarily if necessary. he Commission judged Bosnia’s accession process to be ‘at a stand-
still’ in 201481 but the 2015 Stabilisation and Accession Agreement represented progress.82 
While EUFOR Althea was further extended in 2015 and 2016there are no illusions about 
the scale of di culty still apparent.83 he main objectives of EUFOR Althea are to provide 
the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) with capacity-building and training, to support the en-
tire EU strategy in the country and to maintain a secure and safe environment by provid-
ing support to all eforts on the ground geared towards that process.84 he operation can 
be evaluated as partially successful and eicient especially in the context of its relatively 
low cost (Interviews, 12, 18).85
75 Knezevic 2018.
76 Irish Times 2017.
77 OHR 1995.
78 Gross 2007; Keohane 2009, 218; Merlingen 2013, 150; Whitman and Juncos 2009–2014; Kirch-
ner 2013; Boštjančič Pulko et al. 2016.
79 Foreign and Commonwealth Oice 2007; Hansard 2008; European Council 2010; Council of 
the European Union 2010; European Commission 2014, 2015b.
80 Overhaus 2009, 28.
81 European Commission 2014, 1.
82 European Commission 2015a.
83 United Nations 2015, 2016; EU Delegation BiH 2017; European Commission 2015c.
84 EUFOR Althea 2017, 2018.
85 Boštjančič Pulko et al. 2016.
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Althea’s ‘civilianisation’ is an indication of this partial success (Interviews 15,16), relect-
ing a more stable security situation, albeit one inherited from SFOR, and one to which 
various instruments and organisations contribute.86 In the absence of a sustained threat, 
the mission’s main function has been reassurance.87 Althea has enjoyed local support,88 
and despite reduced strength it contributes to a safe and secure environment.89 Historic 
achievements include weapons harvesting, intelligence gathering, patrolling, tracking and 
catching indicted war criminals, combating organised crime and supporting local law en-
forcement agencies, including training and capacity building for the BiH Armed Forces, 
now better equipped to take on stabilisation and security responsibilities across the coun-
try. Undoubted achievements should not obscure shortcomings that have implications 
for CSDP and EU aspirations for the region. BiH state dysfunction remains endemic and 
casts doubt on whether the EU engagement can be described as a strategic success. Vari-
ous scholars conirm alarming levels of dysfunction, instability and political stagnation.90
Meanwhile Commission reports after the SAA are downbeat on political and economic 
reform, noting only limited progress in most areas, including public administration, justice 
system, dealing with corruption, ighting organised crime, human rights and the rights of 
minorities, and in economic criteria including establishing a functioning market economy.91
CSDP implementation in BiH relects the minimalist, lowest-common-denominator, 
issue-by-issue characteristics of the initiative (Interviews 1, 8, 9, 12, 13, 28). It depends 
on limited resources and weak commitment from Member States.92 he threat in 2004 
was that Bosnia could revert to chaos or become a seedbed for regional violence, a threat 
which has not gone away and may even have grown with the emergence of DAESH/ISIS, 
which Europol suggests may have established training camps in the Balkans.93 Althea is 
a post-conlict peacekeeping operation, now comprising a mere 600 personnel from 17 
EU Member States and ive partner nations.94 he majority are from Austria, Hungary, 
and non-EU member, Turkey – a curious relection of the country’s history. Chappell and 
Petrov describe Althea as a manifestation of EU strategic interest in the Western Balkans 
to establish peace and security95 but Althea oicials criticise the lack of an adequately 
strategic approach (Interviews 15–21). his seems harsh given the context of enlarge-
ment policy, the Stability Pact for South East Europe and €13.1bn of regional investment 
86 Ibid.
87 Bertin 2008, 67; Overhaus 2009, 21.
88 Bertin, 2008:67.
89 Gross 2015; Boštjančič Pulko et al. 2016.
90 Gross 2007; McMahon and Western 2009; Whitman and Juncos 2009–2014.
91 European Commission 2016.
92 Boštjančič Pulko et al. 2016.
93 Telegraph 2016.
94 EEAS 2014; EUFOR Althea 2017.
95 Chappell and Petrov 2014.
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between 2008 and 2014 from the Western Balkans Investment Framework.96 But critical 
opinion suggests a lack of a clear exit strategy and no deined and measurable outcomes 
as on-going weaknesses in EUFOR Althea’s BiH engagement.97
Klein reports that the former mission commander General Leakey, backed by former HR 
Solana, saw the ight against organised crime and providing a safe and secure environment 
as complementary.98 EUFOR Althea personnel contributed to disrupting crime through 
vehicle checks and similar interventions but this brought criticism from the parallel EU 
Police Mission.99 EUPM considered EUFOR involvement an unwelcome interference in 
policing responsibilities.100 Eva Gross also noted concerns over coherence between difer-
ent actors.101 he EU Special Representative in Sarajevo and the PSC adjusted the over-
lapping competences of the missions, giving EUPM the lead in ighting crime, in capacity 
building and institutional development in support of the local police. EU instruments in 
BiH had inherited roles from previous UN interests: EUPM replaced the International 
Police Task Force (IPTF), Althea followed NATO’s SFOR, while the EUSR is an extension 
of the UNHR, so all three instruments lacked full EU identity and purpose.102 Despite the 
EUPM closing in 2012, there still remains public suspicion of law enforcement agencies in 
BiH and little conidence in police competence or trustworthiness.103
A vital context to EUFOR Althea it operates in a post-conlict society where internal secu-
rity risks endure, albeit on a reduced scale. While the quantity of weapons in the country 
has diminished, Bertin described a ‘weak economy (with) widespread organised crime 
and corruption and the fragility of the rule of law (...) deeply divided along ethnic lines and 
across the two entities (...) the Bosniak/Croat Federation and Republika Srpska’.104
his assessment holds true a decade later. Althea’s long-term, strategic task is ‘to leave 
behind a peaceful and stable Bosnia en route towards EU membership’.105 he 2014 elec-
tions echoed the downbeat assessments reported above as they relected the ethnic divi-
sions institutionalised by the DPA.106 he most immediate threat to the integrity of the 
state is the apparent determination of the Republika Srpska leadership to further promote 
nationalist sentiment and undermine the federal institutions and judicial authorities. he 
96 WBIF 2014, 11.
97 Boštjančič Pulko et al. 2016.
98 Klein 2010, 150.
99 EUPM BiH n.d.
100 Merlingen and Ostrauskaité 2006.
101 Gross 2007.
102 Dziewulska 2011.
103 Boštjančič Pulko et al. 2016.
104 Bertin 2008, 61–2.
105 Ibid., 76.
106 New York Times 2014; Biermann 2014.
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UN High Representative Valentin Inzko reported in 2015 that while BiH had been ‘a shin-
ing star in peacebuilding and reintegration’ during the irst ten years after Dayton, the 
next ten years had shown an alarming level of dysfunction. State integrity is undermined 
by Republika Srpska holding a referendum in September 2016 on the right to have a na-
tional holiday and threatening another on the status of the BiH federal institutions.107 
Inzko criticised the 2016 referendum as a lagrant deiance of the Dayton-Paris Accords 
and federal state constitutional provisions. He expressed regret at gains made by national-
ist candidates in elections in October. At the same time, the RS national assembly chose to 
decorate several convicted war criminals, including Radovan Karadžić.108 While Bosnia is 
stuck in a political quagmire, the economy also remains in a parlous state.109
he EUFOR Althea mandate relects a subtle shift in the focus of the operation. Now 
instead of the main thrust being to uphold the Dayton Peace Accords, the emphasis is 
on a safe and secure environment and capacity building and training (CB&T) for the 
federal armed forces (AFBiH). his complements the multinational battalion (MNBN) 
established since 2007, able to act autonomously or in support of the BiH authorities or 
international community agencies in theatre as requested. he third area of operations is 
Liaison and Observations Teams distributed throughout the territory as ‘eyes and ears’ 
able to communicate situational reports to EUFOR HQ in Butmir, Sarajevo.110
Given the weakness of the federal institutions, what conclusions can be drawn about the 
implementation of Althea? his research suggests that the mission delivers improve-
ments, but fundamental challenges regarding the integrity of the state are not adequately 
addressed. Althea depends on agreement and compromise among 28 member states. 
Chronic resource inadequacies remain as personnel reductions have not been mirrored 
by fundamental improvements in governance, or socio-economic prospects. Althea faces 
formidable challenges, well beyond the UN-provided remit. If a fundamental problem 
is that the DPA consolidates ethnic cleansing and has not delivered consensus on state 
structures, this is not an issue for EUFOR Althea. If the entities comprising the state 
cannot cohere around the federal institutions, this is a matter for the wider international 
community as well as for Bosnia and Herzegovina itself. Clearly the EU has a huge stake 
in the future stability and security of BiH, but the challenges involved extend beyond the 
remit and capabilities of EUFOR Althea. Despite deiciencies, the operation retains the 
strong local support and its capacity building and training of the AFBiH helps to establish 
a safe and secure environment (SASE), especially as Althea seeks to transfer this respon-
sibility to BiH itself, consistent with the EU principle of ‘local ownership’.111
107 United Nations 2015.
108 United Nations 2016.
109 European Commission 2014, 2015b, 2016; Heritage Foundation 2018.
110 EUFOR Althea, 2018. 
111 Ejdus 2018; Donais 2008; EU 2008.
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EUFOR Althea’s achievements have proceeded in a piecemeal and incremental fashion, 
typical of ‘muddling through’.112 Nevertheless, the mission itself reports declining public 
conidence in the security situation.113 A long-held criticism of the EU is that it is remote, 
lacking proper engagement with the issues facing Bosnia (Interviews 15–17,19,21). his 
relects the lack of political will among member states. But CSDP lies within CFSP, an 
intergovernmental ield. here have been signiicant institutional developments, namely 
increased Commission involvement, EEAS consolidation, and engaged, proactive leader-
ship from the HRVP. his position provides important bridging between the Commission 
and Council, while the CMPD, answerable to the PSC, has improved mission coordination.
Bureaucratic Politics, Emergent Strategy?
Grand Strategy presupposes strategic goals backed by adequate resourcing and actorness. 
A tension exists between Grand Strategy and bureaucratic politics given the fundamen-
tally bureaucratic nature of EU policy-making and implementation processes, as well as 
the failure of intergovernmentalism, to deliver a strategic EU security and defence policy. 
While bureaucracy is what modern society and modern states depend upon, bureaucratic 
politics is the process through which CSDP governance operates.
EUFOR Althea is an example of CSDP working through bureaucratic politics where sub-
optimal outcomes are the norm and missions are governed by a hierarchical technocracy 
that answers to member states through the Council and its proxies, especially the PSC. 
CSDP demonstrates limited legitimacy through a low level of public consent and mini-
mal parliamentary scrutiny. CSDP is run by a complex network of committees stafed by 
technocratic experts and oicials appointed by member states and other EU organisa-
tions. Outcomes are low-level and under-reported, making scrutiny di cult; they relect 
‘satisicing’ rather than strategic gains.114 Compromise and consensus are goals of the 
policy-making process, rather than defending principles. A DGAP expert (Interview 25) 
describes CSDP as a ‘technocratic community’ rather than a political one, while another 
(Interview 23) describes an EEAS ‘technocratic culture’. 
Member states have regarded BiH as relatively low-risk. hey assume that renewed inter-
communal violence is unlikely, even as Althea itself and the UNHR for BiH report a de-
teriorating political and security environment. Althea has not been a priority interest. It 
has depended on lowest-common-denominator agreement; it has lacked clearly deined 
targets, or measurable outcomes, its success remains hard to measure. he short tenure 
of oicials, whether posted directly to the mission, or as member state appointees to the 
EEAS/security arena in Brussels, also suggests a ‘muddling through’ approach relying on 
horizontal networks to meet minimal organisational goals.
112 Lindblom 1959, 83.
113 EUFOR Althea 2017.
114 Allison and Zelikow 1999, 152.
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Given this context, can there be a strategic dimension to the mission, perhaps relecting 
CSDP as a whole? he EU’s wider Balkans policy does suggest a strategic – and compre-
hensive - approach, but weak member state commitment undermines the potential for 
positive outcomes, particularly in a short timeframe. At best this is an emergent strategy, 
rooted in gradualism and minimalism. CSDP implementation in BiH suggests a strategy 
of sorts, but hardly a Grand Strategy. 
In management studies literature there is a link between bureaucracy and emergent strat-
egy. his its with the bureaucratic politics of CSDP. he European Union, member states 
and the Commission especially rely on a gradualist, incremental and low-cost approach 
to transformation in the Balkans. his is especially di cult in Bosnia (and Kosovo) where 
chronic political dysfunction and sectarian division persists. he ‘frozen conlict’ remains, 
and Republika Srpska has little interest in the survival of the federal state. Ethnic tensions 
remain within and between the entities and ethnicities comprising the federal state. 
According to Mintzberg, the contemporary organisation works as a system characterized 
by formal authority, regulated lows, informal communication, work constellations, and 
ad hoc decision processes.115 here are parallels with the hierarchical and technocratic 
processes of bureaucratic politics in this description. Organisations function in complex 
and varying ways due to difering lows, including lows of authority, work material, infor-
mation, and decision processes.116 Strategy emerges from multiple processes,117 including 
disjointed incrementalism,118 lessons learned, entrepreneurial factors relating to vision 
and leadership, and power dynamics comprising both micro-power within organisations 
and macro-power. 
his correlates well with CSDP post-Lisbon, where intergovernmental power interacts 
with policy-making networks in the multilevel and heterarchical system of EU foreign 
and security policy.119 Freedman conirms the importance of lessons learned in a com-
plex and changing environment, where a linear top-down imposed strategy is unlikely 
to work.120 Instead a form of ‘emergent strategy’ that takes account of complexity and 
changing circumstances, multiple channels of inluence and complex decision-making 
networks is more likely to succeed. A senior EDA oicial (Interview 7) highlights coor-
dination and chain-of-command di culties, echoing Asseburg and Kempin who report 
a lessons-learned process in CSDP as ‘woefully absent’ especially in the civil sphere.121 
Bossong similarly criticises the informal and haphazard way in which experience informs 
115 Mintzberg 1979; Mintzberg and McHugh 1985.
116 Mintzberg 1978, 1979; Mintzberg and Waters 1985.
117 Mintzberg and Lampel 1999.
118 Lindblom 1959.
119 Mérand et al. 2011.
120 Freedman 2013, 555.
121 Asseburg and Kempin 2009, 154.
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a learning process, while also estimating that the EEAS will bring more efective tracking 
of experience which should improve mission efectiveness.122 It is surprising that the rec-
ommendations in the EEAS Review do not include the introduction of a proper lessons-
learned approach.123 his is fertile ground for more research to better understand the 
processes through which CSDP can beneit from emergent strategy. It also connects with 
the notion of an emergent EU strategic culture.124
Mintzberg and Lampel refer to an emergent strategy that uses social processes and cultur-
al factors,125 a constructivist dimension which recalls Brusselisation.126 In a development 
of Mintzberg’s notion of emergent strategy, Chia and Holt consider rational, deliberate 
and designed strategy as naïve, given the existence of too many contingencies and alterna-
tive limits, and too many system inluences. Instead they point to ‘the surprising eicacy 
of indirect action’.127 his chimes with the ascendancy of bureaucratic politics where much 
is indirect, and where even ‘confusion between (...) oicials’ may contribute to policy out-
comes.128 he following description of a type of bureaucracy appears to match the domi-
nant characteristics of CSDP: ‘A system of representative government requires oicials to 
act as the custodians of the constitutional values it embodies (so) it cannot frame the role 
of bureaucrats solely in terms of eicient management, performance, responsiveness and 
securing results’.129
In other words, bureaucracies are not predictable: they display characteristics other than 
eicient management with measurable results. he EU is a system of representative gov-
ernment, a democratic type, and a bureaucracy. It purports to uphold values that are core 
to its evolving strategic culture, but the manner in which it pursues its ambition relects 
bureaucratic politics, where values may be shared but eiciency or even efectiveness can-
not be guaranteed, or even satisfactorily measured. Broadly expressed values, for so long 
underpinning the construction of a social Europe, have been shaken by the neoliberal 
ascendancy since the 2004 enlargement, and by deep divisions between member states on 
how to deal with the problems of Economic and Monetary Union, the travails of the single 
currency, and mass migration provoked by wars and state failure in MENA and beyond. 
122 Bossong 2013.
123 EEAS 2013a.
124 Biava et al. 2011.
125 Mintzberg and Lampel 1999.
126 Allen 1998; Mérand 2008.
127 Chia and Holt 2009, 203.
128 Allison 1969, 708.
129 du Gay 2000, 12.
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Conclusion
he comprehensive approach incorporates security with political and economic develop-
ment, and uses a wide range of instruments to pursue diferent but linked objectives. CSDP in 
the Western Balkans relects this while it also revealing an emergent strategy. his article has 
focused on EUFOR Althea, highlighting deep seated problems that the mission faces in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, probably – together with Kosovo − the most challenging in the region. he 
EU approach to the Western Balkans constitutes a strategic endeavour that proceeds incre-
mentally, with modest progress on various fronts. Processes of bureaucratic politics have en-
abled an emergent strategy precisely because, as with Brusselsisation, there has been no power 
transfer, avoiding the failure that Grand Strategy would arguably have encountered, given the 
near certainty that Member States would have resisted supranational institution building in 
the defence and security arena, preferring instead to protect the intergovernmentalism that 
has underpinned common foreign and security policy since Maastricht.
EU instruments, including EUFOR Althea, the EUSR and the EUD in Sarajevo, and Com-
mission engagement through the SAA, have undoubtedly helped to stabilise Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. But a deteriorating situation now requires a stronger military presence.130 
So, while EUFOR Althea can be said to have ‘civilianised’, relying on NATO to preserve re-
gional peace is not sustainable. Much the same can be said of the entire Common Security 
and Defence Policy: it needs military credibility.
Here and elsewhere I have argued that traditional intergovernmentalism has proven unable 
to deliver on the promise of common security and defence.131 Grand Strategy has proven 
elusive due to signiicant non-cooperation, outright opposition, or free-riding by various 
member states. Instead progress has been achieved through bureaucratic politics which has 
facilitated a process of emergent strategy throughout the Western Balkans. We are prob-
ably at the limit of what this gradualist and incremental process can achieve, it being overly 
reliant on a Brussels-based technocracy. Contemporary threats and turbulence in the in-
ternational environment and even in the Union itself – such as the UK’s presumed depar-
ture (Brexit) – can spur determination to achieve common security and defence through 
the overdue activation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).132 he technocratic 
processes of the open method of coordination (OMC) can also play a key role in building 
common policy and capability in this area.133 Together with PESCO, through which groups 
of Member States cooperate in security and defence while others remain semi-detached 
or outside the initiative, this may inally bring the Union towards a coherent and even an 
integrated common security and defence arrangement. In an increasingly unstable environ-
ment, this looks essential for the peace and stability of the EU and its environment. he UK 
too, Brexit or No Brexit, should be fully integrated in this endeavour.
130 Arbeiter and Udovič 2016.
131 Sweeney and Winn 2017.
132 European Council 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; EEAS 2018; Biscop, 2017.
133 Sweeney and Winn 2017.
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Appendix: Interviews
1 Security and defence policy expert, ISIS, Paris 16/06/2010
2 Expert on EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels 17/06/2010
3 European foreign and security policy expert, Leeds 25/06/2010
4 Security and defence policy expert, Brussels 01/07/2010
5 Former military oicer and ESDP expert, Brussels 08/09/2010
6 Expert on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, Brussels, 09/09/2010
7 Senior Oicial in EDA, Brussels 10/09/2010
8 Oicial in EU Military Staf in Council Secretariat, Brussels, 22/09/2010
9 Military oicial in CMPD, Brussels, 24/09/2010
10 Security and defence expert in ECFR, London 30/09/2010
11 EU Foreign policy expert, York, 18/11/2010
12 Senior Oicial in MoD, London 10/03/2011
13 Military representative inside EEAS, Brussels 23/03/2011
14 Former Member of Venusberg Group, Munich 25/03/2011 (telephone)
15-21 EUFOR ALTHEA Sarajevo interviews
15 Consultant to EUFOR Althea, 16/05/2011
16 Senior Oicial in OHR, 17/05/2011
17 Chief of Political Dept in OHR, 17/05/2011
18 Senior Oicial in EUFOR HQ, 18/05/2011
19 Senior Oicial (2) in EUFOR HQ, 18/05/2011
20 Consultant to project for EU Delegation/European Commission, 19/05/2011
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21 Senior Policy Adviser to EUSR/EUFOR, 25/05/2011 (telephone)
22 Defence and security expert, Stiftung Wissenshaft und Politik, Berlin 27/09/2011
23 Defence and security expert, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin. 
27/09/2011
24 SPD Member of Bundestag in the Grand Coalition 2002-06, 09/07/2012
25 Defence and security expert, DGAP, Berlin11/07/2012
26 Senior Oicial in the European Parliament, 10/05/2013
27 Expert on Kosovo and EULEX KOSOVO, Leeds, 18/07/2013
28 Senior Brussels-based journalist and EU expert (various dates)
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